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Introduction
On 1 June 2004 Mauritius passed its data protection le-
gislation, the Data Protection Act 2004 (DPA). The Act
was assented to by Sir Enerood Jugnauth, the President
of Mauritius on 17 June 2004. However, it did not im-
mediately come into force. The first set of the DPA’s
provisions, sections 1, 2, 4, 5(b),(c),(e),(g),(h),(i),(j),
and 6 came into force on 27 December 2004.1 These
provisions are about the short title of the Act, inter-
pretation, establishment of the office of Data Protection
Commission (DPC), vesting it with limited functions,
confidentiality and the oath of the Commissioner and
other DPC staff. The second set of provisions of the
DPA—the rest of the Act—came into force on 16 Feb-
ruary 2009.2 However, the second implementation did
not include section 17. The latter, which constitutes the
third phase in proclamation, did not come into force
until it was amended on 15 April 2009.3 The amended
section 17 came into force on 22 May 2009.4
Patterned on the European data protection system,
the DPA incorporates the basic principles of data pro-
cessing as well as a supervisory authority. The latter is
the central authority set up to implement the DPA.
This article analyses the complaint resolution role of
the Mauritius Data Protection Commission. Excluded
from the purview of this article are other functions of
the DPC, though admittedly, some of them may have
ramifications for the complaint resolution role.
The analysis presented here is significant for three
reasons. First, it gives a broad overview of the practice
of data protection law in Mauritius. In turn, if the
DPC’s interpretation of the law has any sensible results,
this broad picture of how the DPA functions in practice
may compliment the EU accreditation process, a recent
assessment of which indicates that Mauritius has failed
to pass the ‘adequacy’ requirement set out in the EU
Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC.5 Yet, if such an in-
terpretation by the DPC is still wanting, this article will
illuminate the areas which require improvements in
order to strengthen the data protection practices.
Second, since Mauritius is the only country in sub-
Saharan Africa making many decisions, its interpret-
ation of the DPA may somewhat influence the practice
of other supervisory authorities on the sub-continent.
* Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Open University of Tanzania. E-mail: alex.
makulilo@gmail.com.
1 Proclamation No. 45 of 2004.
2 Proclamation No. 5 of 2009.
3 The amendment was made through the Additional Stimulus Package
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2009, Act No. 1 of 2009.
4 Proclamation No. 11 of 2009.
5 CRID (Research Center on IT and Law), University of Namur (Belgium),
‘Analysis of the Adequacy of the Protection of Personal Data provided in
Mauritius, Final Report, 2010’. (Note that the opinions contained in this
report are not of the European Union itself but of a commissioned
consultant and hence do not necessarily reflect the position of the
European Union).
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Abstract
† One of the functions of most data protection au-
thorities is to decide complaints filed to them by
individuals and institutions.
† In the course of passing their decisions, data
protection authorities interpret data protection
legislation. This article analyses the early deci-
sions of the Mauritius Data Protection Commis-
sion from the onset of its establishment.
† The point of departure for discussion is the
Mauritian Data Protection Act 2004 as well as
regulations, codes of conduct, and guidelines
made under such Act.
† The conclusion drawn from this analysis is that
while these decisions reflect the basic data pro-
tection principles laid down in the law, they are
not consistent to some extent. Similarly such
decisions have at times taken into account
factors beyond the provisions of the law.
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Thus, it is imperative to examine how the basic data
protection principles are implemented in practice in an
African jurisdiction. The matter is more significant as
the African Union (AU) as well as Southern African
Development Community (SADC) are considering the
adoption of regional and sub-regional data protection
regimes respectively. At the same time, it is important
to hint that the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) had already adopted a sub-regional
data protection framework. Similarly, the East African
Community (EAC) had adopted recommendations
which provide guidance to its member countries in le-
gislating national data protection legislation. Third, as
is the case in many other jurisdictions where the role of
the courts is invariably minimal in providing interpret-
ation of data protection legislation,6 commentaries and
analyses like this are important as an aid to commis-
sioners in their roles.
The Data Protection Act
Scope and application
The Data Protection Act applies to both public and
private bodies. It also regulates both automatic and
manual processing of personal data. Yet such processing
of personal data is limited to individual natural/physic-
al persons only, called the ‘data subject’. Legal/juristic
persons are outside the purview of the Act.
Territorially, the DPA has a broad scope. It applies to
a data controller who is established in Mauritius.7 In
addition such a controller must process personal data
in the context of that establishment.8 However in case
a controller is not established in Mauritius but uses
equipment in Mauritius for processing data, such a
controller is subject to the DPA.9
The DPA has an extensive exemption regime. The
latter is either partial or whole. The list of matters
wholly exempted are national security (sect. 45); crime
and taxation (sect. 46); health and social work (sect.
47); regulatory activities (sect. 48); journalism, litera-
ture, and art (sect. 49); research, history and statistics
(sect. 50); information available to the public under an
enactment (sect. 51); disclosure required by law or in
connection with legal proceedings (sect. 52); legal pro-
fessional privilege (sect. 53); and domestic purposes
(sect. 54). Partial exemption usually takes the form of
relieving the controller from the obligations of notifica-
tion and the application of certain data protection
principles.
The eight data protection principles
The basic principles of data processing in the Data Pro-
tection Act 2004 are provided in the First Schedule,
entitled ‘Data Protection Principles’. This schedule con-
tains eight data protection principles inspired by Euro-
pean Directive 95/46/EC and to some extent by the
OECD Guidelines. These principles are complimented
by various codes of practice and guidelines developed
by the Commissioner. Together they provide some
insights into the understanding and interpretation of
the eight principles. Three of the main codes and
guidelines are: ‘A Practical Guide for Data Controllers
& Data Processors Volume 1’ (‘Practical Guide’) and
‘Data Protection—Your Rights—Volume 3’ and ‘Guide-
lines to regulate the Processing of Personal Data by
Video Surveillance Systems—Volume 5’.
The first principle provides that personal data shall
be processed fairly and lawfully. The criteria of ‘fair-
ness’ and ‘lawfulness’ are extensively covered in Rule 1
of the Practical Guide. ‘Fair collection’ means that the
data subject has been fully made aware of the fact that
his or her data are being collected. On the other hand
‘fair processing’ entails fulfilment of the conditions sti-
pulated in sections 24 and 25 of the DPA. Section
24(1) states, ‘no personal data shall be processed,
unless the data controller has obtained the express
consent of the data subject’. Yet, the Practical Guide
does not explain what is meant by ‘lawfully’. However
in its wider sense ‘lawfully’ may mean processing that
is in compliance with the provisions of the DPA. This
may include elements of authorization (eg consent) as
legal justification for processing personal data.
The second principle states that personal data shall
be obtained only for a specified and lawful purpose,
and shall not be further processed in any manner in-
compatible with that purpose. This principle is partly
reflected in sections 22(1), 26(a),(b), and 29 of the
DPA. Rule 2 of the Practical Guide, which interprets
the second principle, prohibits the collection of infor-
mation about people routinely and indiscriminately,
without having a sound, clear, and legitimate purpose
for so doing. Data controllers can only process personal
information against the purpose for which it was regis-
tered in the entry of the public register.
6 See eg, LA Bygrave, ‘Where have all the judges gone? Reflections on
judicial involvement in developing data protection law’, (2000) 7/1
Privacy Law & Policy Reporter 11–14 & (2000) 7/2 33–6.
7 Data Protection Act 2004, s.3 (3), (a).
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid, s.3 (3), (b).
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The third principle is the purpose specification. It
requires that personal data shall be adequate, relevant,
and not excessive in relation to the purpose for which
they are processed. Rule 7 of the Practical Guide
elaborates the third principle to require that the data
controller should only collect and keep enough infor-
mation that enables him or her to achieve the purpose
for which information is collected and no more. The
controller is prohibited to collect and keep information
‘just in case’ a use can be found for the data in the
future. Likewise, controllers are prohibited from asking
intrusive or personal questions, if the information
obtained in this way has no bearing on the specified
purpose for which he or she holds the personal data.
The fourth principle is that personal data shall be
accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date. This
principle also appears as an obligation in section 23 of
the DPA. Rule 6 of the Practical Guide provides that a
data controller, after being informed as to the inaccu-
rateness of personal data by a data subject, must rectify,
block, erase, or destroy the data as appropriate. This
obligation extends to third parties. If the data control-
ler fails to rectify, block, erase, or destroy inaccurate
personal data, a data subject may apply to the Com-
missioner to have such data rectified, blocked, erased,
or destroyed. Rule 6 provides further that this require-
ment (ie keeping data accurate and up-to-date) has
additional importance in that it may result in the liabil-
ity of a data controller to an individual for damages if
the former fails to observe the duty of care provision in
the Act applying to the handling of personal data.
The fifth principle concerns data retention. It requires
that personal data processed for any purpose shall not
be kept longer than is necessary for the purpose or those
purposes. This principle is otherwise known as retention
of personal data. Rule 8 of the Practical Guide provides
that this requirement places a responsibility on data
controllers to be clear about the length of time for
which the data will be kept and the reason why the in-
formation is being retained. If there is no good reason
for retaining personal information, then that informa-
tion should be routinely deleted. Moreover, if the data
controller wishes to retain information about customers
to help provide better service to them in future, he or
she must obtain the customers’ consent in advance.
The sixth principle is that personal data shall be pro-
cessed in accordance with the rights of the data subjects
under the DPA. This principle has to be read in con-
junction with Part VI of the DPA which deals with the
rights of data subjects. The right of access to personal
data under section 41 is the most important to the ex-
ercise of other rights of rectification, blockage, erasure,
or destruction in section 44 of the DPA. Rule 10 of the
Practical Guide essentially repeats the requirements and
exceptions provided in Part VI of the DPA. Moreover it
places an obligation on the data controller to explain
to the data subject the logic used in any automated de-
cision-making process where the decision significantly
affects the individual and the decision is solely based
on the automated process.
The seventh principle is a security principle. It states
that appropriate security and organizational measures
shall be taken against unauthorized or unlawful pro-
cessing of personal data and against accidental loss or
destruction of, or damage to, personal data. This prin-
ciple is broadly covered in section 27 of the DPA as
part of the obligation of the data controller.
The eighth principle is about the international trans-
fer of personal data. It states that personal data shall
not be transferred to another country, unless that
country ensures an adequate level of protection of the
rights of data subjects in relation to the processing of
personal data. This principle has to be read together
with section 31 of the DPA. The latter section deals
with the international transfer of personal data similar
to Articles 25 and 26 of Directive 95/46/EC. Rule 9 of
the Practical Guide interprets the eighth principle to-
gether with section 31 as setting out two criteria for
the transfer of personal data to a foreign country,
namely (i) that the foreign country in question ensures
an adequate level of data protection and also (ii) the
transfer is authorized in writing by the Commissioner.
Other rules of data processing
Apart from the eight data protection principles, the
DPA contains special rules for the processing of person-
al data. These include sensitivity; direct marketing; and
data matching.
The Commissioner’s decisions
An overview
Since the DPA has come into force, the Commissioner
has handed down a total of ten decisions. Before ana-
lysing these decisions, it is important to highlight their
main general features. To start with, all the Commis-
sioner’s decisions have been posted on the Commis-
sion’s website. Postings appear to be made immediately
after a decision is made. However, it is difficult to es-
tablish exactly the date of publication, as the website
does not contain this information. Pending complaints
are unknown since the Commissioner neither posts
this information on the website nor in annual reports.
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However, the Commissioner had reported in her
annual reports the number of complaints received in a
particular year and the areas where such complaints
fall. For example, in the second annual report of 2010,
the Commissioner received two complaints.10 In 2011,
the Commissioner received eleven complaints and
decided six of them.11
A party lodging a complaint is called the ‘complain-
ant’ while the party against which a complaint is
lodged is called the ‘respondent’. The identities of the
complainant and respondent are always anonymized.
The Commissioner has done this on the basis of a duty
of confidentiality imposed upon her and every officer
in the Commission under section 6 of the DPA.
However, some non-direct parties to a complaint are
fully named by their identities. This is the case, for
example, in the third and fifth decisions considered
below.
Citation of these decisions is by reference number,
followed by ‘In the matter of ’, then the names of the
parties. The first and second decisions are referenced as
PMO/DPO/DEC while in the third to tenth they are
DPO/DEC. In each case a serial number of a decision
is added at the end. In these references PMO stands for
‘Prime Minister’s Office’, DPO is the ‘Data Protection
Office’ and DEC stands for ‘decision’. It is not clear
why the Commissioner dropped PMO in the subse-
quent reporting of her decisions. One may argue,
though with some risk of a lack of certainty, that
the Commissioner wanted to demonstrate a sense of
the independence of her office in determining the
complaints.
The other basic feature of the Commissioner’s deci-
sions is that they are relatively short, usually ranging
between two to three A4 pages with only a few deci-
sions exceeding this range. Yet, they are sufficient to
convey information about the nature of a complaint,
the legal issues involved, the essential steps taken by
the Commissioner in investigation, a summary of the
evidence, her findings, and verdicts.
Time is also of essence in complaint resolution. The
Commissioner has taken an average of six months to
one year to resolve one complaint. A number of reasons
may be assigned. First, in some instances complainants
had lodged their complaints with the wrong authority.
When a situation like this occurs, it takes some time
to reroute the complaint to the Commissioner. Second,
some complaints are laid by anonymous complainants.
These types of complaints usually require long investiga-
tions.
As alluded to, so far the Commissioner has decided
ten complaints. It is imperative to survey these deci-
sions in order to uncover: how the basic data protec-
tion principles have been applied in practice; how the
Commissioner has engaged other provisions of the
DPA, codes of practice and guidelines; how relevant
such decisions are in the development of a data protec-
tion system in Mauritius; in whose interest the deci-
sions are made; etc.
Analysis of the ten decisions
In Complainant v Respondents 1, 2, and 3,12 the com-
plaint was about unauthorized use of the complainant’s
curriculum vitae (CV) by respondents 1, 2, and 3. The
complainant alleged that he originally communicated
electronically his CV to respondent 1. The CV was to
be used to support his contract with respondent 1 for
the implementation of a food security project at re-
spondent 2 who was a beneficiary of respondent 3.
In her decision, the Commissioner found that there
was no evidence to support the complaint of unauthor-
ized or unlawful use of personal data in the complai-
nant’s CV by respondents 1, 2, and 3 in carrying out
the project. The reason given by the Commissioner was
that the complainant was not any longer hired as con-
sultant for the project after the cancellation of the con-
tract with respondent 1. She set aside the complaint
under sections 26(a) and (b) and 28 of the Data Pro-
tection Act as the offence had not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
The Commissioner’s decision in this instance is based
on the second principle of data protection, that is
purpose specification. It is also important to note that
the Commissioner’s decision is based on the duty to
destroy personal data under section 28 of the DPA
once its purpose has lapsed. Both of these requirements
were fulfilled by the respondents. Yet, a close examin-
ation of the above decision leaves a lot to be desired.
For example, it was not until the complainant had
brought the matter to the attention of the Commis-
sioner who had officially written to respondent 3, that
the latter was able to return the complainant’s CV.
Arguably, the extended retention of the complainant’s
10 Mauritius Data Protection Office, Third Annual Report 2011, p.9,
,http://www.gov.mu/portal/goc/dpo/files/annrep2010.pdf., accessed
11 August 2012.
11 Mauritius Data Protection Office, Third Annual Report 2011, pp. 5 &8,
,http://www.gov.mu/portal/goc/dpo/files/Jan_Dec2011AnnRep.pdf.,
accessed 11 August 2012.
12 Ref.No: PMO/DPO/DEC/1 (lodged on 21 July 2010, decided on 23
March 2011).
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CV by respondent 3 after notification from the com-
plainant did not comply with section 28 of the DPA.
In Complainant v Respondent13 the complaint was
about the use of CCTV cameras in residential areas.
The complainant alleged that his neighbour, who is the
respondent, had placed CCTV cameras in his yard, the
visual angle of which was directed towards him. As a
result, it had caused and was continuing to cause heavy
prejudice to him by violating his privacy. The com-
plainant further alleged that because of the acts of the
respondent, he was not able to open his kitchen room
and his family was suffering from intense heat during
the summertime.
The Commissioner’s site visit revealed that the
images which were recorded by the respondent’s
camera did not capture anything outside the respon-
dent’s site. She decided that there was no incriminating
evidence against the respondent. Nonetheless, she
required the respondent to place, within two months of
the date of receipt of the decision, a small but visible
and legible sign near his entrance gate or any other ap-
propriate area within his premises to inform all visitors
that CCTV cameras were in operation for security pur-
poses. The rationale for this was to prevent any poten-
tial infringement of the privacy rights of individuals
and violations of the provisions of the DPA. The Com-
missioner set aside the complaint under section 11 of
the DPA as no offence under the DPA had been proved
beyond reasonable doubt.
This decision shows that the Commissioner did not
specifically refer to the ‘Guidelines to regulate the Pro-
cessing of Personal Data by Video Surveillance
Systems—Volume 5’, although she applied some of the
rules laid down. Moreover, in contrast to the first deci-
sion, she set it aside under section 11 of the DPA. Ad-
mittedly, this is the correct enabling provision for the
Commissioner’s decision.
A similar decision involving claims of privacy as a
result of the use of CCTV is Complainant v Respond-
ent.14 In this complaint, the complainant alleged that
the respondent (a college) placed CCTV cameras in
such a position as to affect his private life through the
monitoring of his movements from and to his dwelling
house. He provided the schema of the alleged position-
ing of the camera systems where he resided.
The Commissioner’s site visit to the respondent’s
premise revealed that the respondent installed the
CCTV cameras to deter vandalism from students, tres-
passing by her pupils on neighbouring houses and lit-
tering on the school compound. Despite the sound
justification, the investigation revealed that two
cameras slightly focused beyond the boundary walls
because they were long range surveillance. As a result,
passers-by and vehicles could be viewed outside the
college premises.
The Commissioner decided that the respondent had
implemented corrective measures to safeguard privacy
rights, namely posting the proper signage to inform all
the college’s users of the presence of CCTV cameras.
That was in compliance with sections 22, 23, 24, 25,
26, 27, 28, and 29 and Part VI of the Data Protection
Act. Moreover, the enforcement notice served to the re-
spondent had been observed by her.
Like the previous decision, the Commissioner prop-
erly applied some of the rules in the ‘Guidelines to
regulate the Processing of Personal Data by Video Sur-
veillance Systems–Volume 5’ although without express
reference to it. However, in this particular complaint
the Commissioner found sufficient evidence to incrim-
inate the respondent. Yet she avoided reaching such a
conclusion. Although not specifically stated, this may
be partly due to the Commissioner’s acceptance of the
respondent’s defence of ‘no malicious intention to
invade the privacy rights of the complainant and/or
neighbours’. Instead, she decided that the respondent
had implemented corrective measures and complied
with the enforcement notice. It is also important to
note that this is the only complaint in which the Com-
missioner had used the enforcement notice to make the
respondent compliant with the provisions of DPA.
In Complainant v Respondents 1 and 215 the com-
plaint was about unauthorized marketing by short
service message (SMS). In this matter it was alleged
that the complainant received an SMS on his private
mobile phone number reading as follows: ‘INVEST IN
LAND. Buy land on the heights of Les Marianes. Show
day 19 December from 14h30 onwards. Phone [re-
spondent 1] for more info: . . . ’. The SMS was sent to
the complainant, an officer working with the Office of
Data Protection Commissioner, without his consent.
The complainant’s number was private and registered
on his name at Orange Mauritius Telecom. He requested
an enquiry by the Commissioner as to how the leaking
of his private mobile number had taken place.
13 Ref.No: PMO/DPO/DEC/2 (lodged on 8 November 2010, decided on
25 April 2011).
14 Ref.No: DPO/DEC/4 (lodged on 13 April 2011, decided on 5 August
2011).
15 Ref.No: DPO/DEC/3 (lodged on 17 December 2010, decided on 26 June
2011).
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The Commissioner found that it was proved beyond
reasonable doubt that the SMS complained about was
sent through a genuine error to the complainant on his
mobile and was not meant to cause any prejudice to
him. Nevertheless, she required both respondents to
carry out direct marketing activities in compliance with
the requirements of the DPA, particularly Part IV. She
also required respondent 1 to provide a more user
friendly and efficient marketing system where the
option to deregister or opt-out was incorporated in
the SMS (containing the advert) itself before sending.
The Commissioner required respondent 1 to envisage
opt-in consent to confirm express consent of the custo-
mers electronically together with the signing of the ap-
propriate consent forms as already catered for by him.
Respondent 1 was similarly required to comply with
the principle of purpose specification and security.
Moreover, respondent 2 was required under section 27
of the DPA to enter into a contract with the data pro-
cessor, that is, respondent 1, which stipulates that the
latter would only act on instructions received from the
data controller, that is, respondent 2, and was bound
by the obligations devolving on the data controller. The
complaint was thus set aside for the above legal condi-
tions to be fulfilled.
The Commissioner’s findings in this instance do not
refer or in any case take into account the provisions
of ‘A Practical Guide for Data Controllers & Data
Processor—Volume 1’ regarding direct marketing. As a
result, her decision is fundamentally inconsistent with
her own guidelines. It is particularly significant to note
that the Commissioner has complicated the data sub-
ject’s requirement of consent in the context of direct
marketing. Whereas in the Practical Guide she was pre-
pared to accept ‘passive consent’, that is failure by the
data subject to ‘tick a box’ marked ‘opt-out’ in compli-
ance with the provisions of the DPA, in the present de-
cision she insisted on express consent. Moreover, the
Commissioner’s view, that the express consent already
obtained by respondent 1 in duly written forms was to
be complimented by electronically ‘opt-in’ consent to
confirm the previously obtained consent, raised the
standard too high. It can be argued that the two-stage
consent approach may not be in compliance with
section 24(1) of the DPA which imposes a duty on data
controllers and processors to obtain ‘express consent’
before processing personal data. This provision or
section 30 of the DPA does not impose an extra duty
to ‘confirm consent’ by obtaining another ‘express
consent’ in respect of the same personal data and for
the same purpose. However, a direction to include an
option to deregister in the marketing SMS itself is
plausible and user friendly.
It is interesting to note that in the present complaint
the Commissioner found sufficient evidence that re-
spondent 1 had used the complainant’s private mobile
phone number without his consent. Surprisingly, in her
decision, she avoided expressly ruling so. Instead, she
applied the standard of proof of ‘beyond reasonable
doubt’ to the respondents’ defence. Accordingly she
was prepared to accept ‘genuine error’ as a defence to
mitigate the effect of the unlawful use of someone’s
private mobile phone number.
This complaint also demonstrates the possibilities of
conflicts of interest surrounding the functions and
powers of the Commissioner. As alluded to, the com-
plainant in the present complaint was an officer
working in the Data Protection Office. To partly resolve
the conflict of interest, the Commissioner delegated her
powers to investigate to another person. While this is a
commendable approach, it has to be noted that the
same Commissioner proceeded to decide the com-
plaint. It is not clear how she dealt with the issues of
conflict of interest at the decision stage. It is submitted
that merely working together with the Commissioner
may not necessarily prevent the latter from deciding a
complaint involving a co-employee.
A similar dispute involving unlawful disclosure of
personal data by unauthorised marketing by SMS is
Complainant v Respondent.16 The complainant alleged
that he received an unsolicited SMS on his mobile
phone number. The SMS was sent to him after the
mobile phone service provider had disclosed his per-
sonal information to an unauthorized third party.
The Commissioner decided that there was evidence
on record to suggest that an offence of unlawfully dis-
closing the mobile number of a subscriber to a third
party under section 29 of the DPA may have been com-
mitted. Such an offence is punishable by a fine not
exceeding RS200,000 and a term of imprisonment not
exceeding 5 years. Accordingly, the Commissioner re-
ferred the matter to the police under section 20 for
further investigation and possible prosecution. This de-
cision is a landmark one in the sense that the Commis-
sioner was direct in the exercise of her powers.
Somewhat similar to the preceding two decisions is
Complainant v Respondent.17 The complaint concerned
unauthorized marketing by phone. The complainant
16 Ref.No: DPO/DEC/8 (lodged on 28 June 2011, decided on 12 June 2012). 17 Ref.No: DPO/DEC/5 (lodged on 17 December 2010, decided on 17
August 2011).
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alleged that he received a call from someone claiming
to be calling on behalf of the respondent from tele-
phone number [. . .]. The person calling said to the
complainant that he got the complainant’s number
from Orange (a telecom company in Mauritius). He
also claimed that the complainant was very lucky to
have won a 50 per cent discount on the training
courses the respondent was offering. The complainant
stated in his complaint that he had never played any
game to receive that discount nor had he granted
written authorization to Orange to disclose his private
phone number to any third party. On the base of that,
the complainant requested the Commissioner to inves-
tigate how the leaking of his private mobile number
had taken place.
The Commissioner decided that it was proved
beyond reasonable doubt that the call was made to the
complainant on his mobile by the respondent. She
required the respondent to carry out his marketing ac-
tivities in compliance with the relevant provisions of
the Data Protection Act particularly Part IV. Similarly
the Commissioner required the respondent to provide
a more user friendly and efficient marketing system
whereby the option to deregister or opt-out is given
whilst securing the written consent of the customers
for marketing. Moreover, she directed that consent col-
lected should not be used for any purpose incompatible
with the original purpose. The respondent was also
required to ensure that appropriate security and organ-
izational measures are taken to protect the personal
data of customers.
It can be noted from this decision that the Commis-
sioner required only ‘express consent’ as opposed to
both ‘express consent’ and confirmation of the previous
consent by an ‘opt-in’ option as in the third decision.
Therefore while the two complaints are similar, the
level of consent required has not been consistent.
Moreover, contrary to the Practical Guide, where it is
provided by the Commissioner that express consent
may be oral or written, in the present decision she
insisted that written consent must always be given. It is
also important to note that, although the Commission-
er found the respondent incriminated by evidence, she
did not say so expressly. Instead, she proceeded to
direct corrective measures. Lack of awareness or rather
ignorance of the law pleaded by the respondent might
have influenced the Commissioner not to deal strictly
with the respondent. However such a defence raised by
the respondent had not been expressly considered.
In Complainant v Respondent18 the complaint alleged
unauthorized use of private e-mails. It was lodged by
anonymous data subjects. The allegations were that the
respondent had emailed symbolic pictures of a religious
nature to several persons. For that, he had used com-
plainants’ e-mail addresses without their authorization.
The complainants alleged further that the respondent
used their e-mail addresses allocated to them by the
organizations they were working for and as such he
divulged their private addresses and infringed their
right of privacy.
The Commissioner decided that it was proved
beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent was not
aware of the implications of sending the e-mail
addresses of third parties to unauthorized recipients
and there was no mala fides involved in his action. The
enquiring officers informed him of such implications.
This decision is the first in which the Commissioner
expressly accepted a lack of awareness of the provisions
of the Data Protection Act (ie ignorance of law) as a
defence for the unlawful processing of personal data.
Yet, in the first annual report of 2009, the Commission-
er maintains that ignorance of the obligations under
the DPA is not a legitimate excuse, especially given the
fact that data protection obligations are more often
simply just a question of adopting good civilian
manners.19 She similarly accepted a lack of malicious
intention to harm anybody as a defence. It is also inter-
esting to note that, as in the third decision, the Com-
missioner directed herself on the respondent’s defence
rather than focusing on the merit or otherwise of the
complaint.
In Complaint v Respondents 1 and 2,20 the complaint
concerned the use of personal data in the context of a
debit/credit card. The complainant alleged that respon-
dents 1 and 2 stored his debit/credit card details during
a purchase transaction at the Point of Sale (POS).
The Commissioner decided that it was proved
beyond reasonable doubt that respondents 1 and 2 dis-
played the required effort to remedy the potential
dangers of the personal information of customers being
used for illegal transactions by adopting appropriate
security and organizational measures. However, she
required the respondents to show compliance with
international and local standards by ensuring that per-
18 Ref.No: DPO/DEC/6 (lodged on 18 February 2011, decided on 26 August
2011).
19 Mauritius Data Protection Office, First Annual Report of the Data
Protection Commissioner February 2009–February 2010, p. 42.
20 Ref.No: DPO/DEC/7 (lodged on 7 June 2011, decided on 14 May 2012).
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sonal information as identified above are not kept
illegally.
In Complainant v Respondent21 the complainant
alleged unauthorized use of a password. The facts of
the complaint were as follows. The complainant was an
employee of the respondent. Originally the complain-
ant wrote an anonymous letter to the Commissioner
alleging receiving unsolicited e-mails to her office e-
mail address. Those e-mails contained symbolic pic-
tures of a religious nature and were similarly sent to
several persons using their e-mails without their au-
thorization. The complainant alleged that the respond-
ent divulged the private e-mails allocated to employees
including her, to unauthorized third parties copied in
the same e-mail. On this account, she was suspended
from her post by the respondent alleging that the letter
of complaint sent to the Commissioner was not
authorized by the respondent. Hence it was prejudicial
to the respondent.
The Commissioner decided that first, there is no
legal requirement in the Data Protection Act which
obligates all complainants wishing to lodge a complaint
with the Commissioner to inform and obtain the per-
mission of management. Second, the Commissioner
decided that a password given to an employee is her
personal data. The complainant could not be respon-
sible for unauthorized use of her password which was
at the same time known to the IT department. Finally,
the Commissioner made a number of orders to the re-
spondent to comply with security measures under
section 27 of the DPA. In the above decision, the Com-
missioner did not only confine herself to the interpret-
ation of the DPA, but also the Constitution of
Mauritius and the Employment Rights Act.
The tenth complaint is Complainant v Respondent.22
This was about the unauthorized disclosure of personal
data. Similar to the previous decision, the present deci-
sion arose in the context of employer–employee rela-
tions. The complainant, the employer, alleged that the
respondent, an employee, forwarded personal data
from her office e-mail to her personal e-mail address.
The forwarded files contained pay roll details, employ-
ees’ names, salaries, salary amount, car allowances,
overtimes, loans, and transport.
An investigation by the Commissioner revealed
that the respondent was required to handover her
duties to the complainant as her employment with the
complainant was ending. She forwarded the files to
her personal e-mail address as the office e-mail was
inaccessible outside the office. Yet, she had to complete
her duties at home.
The Commissioner decided that an employee should
seek the authorization of her employer before transfer-
ring confidential information from her office e-mail
address to her personal e-mail address. However, in
this particular matter the Commissioner found that
since the respondent had not used the information for
illegal purposes but only for work purposes and in the
benefit of the employer (ie complainant) in accordance
with the section of ‘required confidentiality’ in the con-
tractual agreement, and has already resigned from the
company, she has not committed any offence under the
Data Protection Act. The Commissioner also took in
account the fact that no mala fide or criminal intent
was detected from the respondent during the enquiry.
It is interesting to note that the Commissioner’s de-
cision in this complaint was not directly based on the
Data Protection Act and its regulations. Her decision
was based on the interpretation of the confidentiality
clause in the respondent’s employment contract.
Summary of the ten decisions
An overview of the Commissioner’s ten decisions
reveals the following common trends. First, in all the
complaints the standard of proof is beyond reasonable
doubt. However, it is less clear who primarily bears the
burden of proof. Also less obvious is the criterion for
the shifting of this burden. Second, the Commissioner
has not strictly enforced the provisions of the DPA. In
most cases she has resisted making an express finding
of infringement of the provisions of the DPA even if
that was the case. This is partly because many data con-
trollers and processors in Mauritius are not aware of
their obligations, suggesting a reason why the Commis-
sioner has accepted ignorance of the law and/or a lack
of awareness of the provisions of the DPA as a defence.
Third, there are no formal definitions of complaint
outcomes. More often the Commissioner concludes her
decision by ‘setting aside’ a complaint. Yet ‘set aside’ is
not clear as sometimes it appears to mean the com-
plaint is not found, hence it is dismissed or it has been
resolved. Therefore, it is difficult to readily ascertain
the outcomes of such complaints. It is submitted that
consistency in reporting the outcomes of complaints
is required. This also needs to be made around
formalized definitions which explain the meaning of
complaint outcomes (resolved, settled, dismissed,
21 Ref.No: DPO/DEC/9 (lodged on 22 September 2011, decided on 12 July
2012).
22 Ref.No: DPO/DEC/10 (lodged on 3 October 2011, decided on 19 July
2012).
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withdrawn, etc.). Fourth, the current way of anonymiz-
ing parties to the complaint is somewhat confusing.
Parties appear to be the same in most complaints. This
may cause difficulties for properly distinguishing these
decisions. An alternative way of achieving anonymity
while maintaining some degree of identification for dis-
tinguishing decisions is to refer to the names of parties
by initial capital letters of their first names (eg Z v P).
Also important in the citation of decisions is to add
the year of the decision. Fifth, in all ten decisions, the
Commissioner has not explained to the parties their
right of appeal to the ICT Appeal Tribunal, as is
required under section 11(b) of the DPA. It is not
certain whether the Commissioner has been using a
different method to notify the parties of this right. The
Commissioner had confirmed that none of her deci-
sions were appealed to the ICT Appeal Tribunal partly
because parties were satisfied by the Commissioner’s
decision.23 However, one point has to be made clear.
None of the above ten decisions ended with settlement.
Hence the signed declarations by parties in the Com-
missioner’s decisions that they consented for a site
visit, were satisfied with the way the complaint and/or
investigation were handled do not qualify as settlement
to bar appeals. It is imperative to note that the Com-
mission’s website is not linked to the website of the
ICT Appeal Tribunal. This makes it difficult to ascertain
if there is any appeal in the Tribunal arising from
the Commissioner’s decision. However, the strategies
employed by the Commissioner to require parties to
make written declarations as to their satisfaction with
the outcomes of the investigation and the decision
offer solid grounds to believe that no appeal has ever
been referred to the ICT Appeal Tribunal. Such declara-
tions, to say the least, have largely headed-off any pos-
sibility of appeal.
It can be submitted that most of the problems
enumerated above are largely caused by the absence of
regulations on proceedings of the Commission in de-
termining complaints. In connection with this, the
Commissioner once observed that section 11 of the
DPA simply provides for investigation of the com-
plaint, notification to the complainant in writing of her
decision and information about the appeal to the ICT
Appeal Tribunal.24 ‘There is no provision in the Data
Protection Act on the manner in which a hearing may
take place and the evidences to be submitted before the
Commissioner . . . ’25
Future trends
Despite their pitfalls in some places, the decisions of
the Commissioner provide a fertile ground for the con-
solidation of data protection practices. As one may
notice, in the last three decisions, the Commissioner
has started to unfold her powers. Perhaps this is
because a considerable period has passed since the
Mauritius Data Protection Act came into force, sug-
gesting that data controllers and processors are some-
what familiar with the requirements imposed upon
them by the Act. Perhaps also, this is due to the fact
that the Commissioner had made considerable efforts
to bring the law to the knowledge of the public (con-
trollers, processors, and data subjects) through presen-
tations, leaflets, seminars, and workshops. Since
Mauritius is currently seeking EU accreditation of its
data protection system, the Commissioner is likely to
continue to tighten her grip in making bold decisions
to instil confidence in the European Union that the
data protection regime is adequate.
doi:10.1093/idpl/ips038
23 Interview by the author of this article and the Mauritius Data Protection
Commissioner, Port Luis, Mauritius, 4 July 2011(note that little is known
about decisions which were decided after the date of this interview).
However, there are solid grounds to believe that no appeal has ever been
referred to the ICT Appeal Tribunal as explained in the article.
24 Mauritius Data Protection Office, First Annual Report of the Data
Protection Commissioner February 2009–February 2010, p. 14.
25 Ibid.
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